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5 **ELIZABETH COX**, individually and on behalf
6 of all others similarly situated,

7 Plaintiffs,

8 vs.

9 **GRUMA CORPORATION, et al.**,

10 Defendant.

11 **Case No.: 12-CV-6502 YGR**

12 **NOTICE OF TENTATIVE RULING FOR JUNE 11,
13 2013 HEARING**

14 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, PLEASE TAKE NOTICE OF AND BE
15 PREPARED TO ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE RULING AT THE HEARING SCHEDULED ON
16 TUESDAY, JUNE 11, 2013, AT 2:00 P.M.:

17 The Court has reviewed the parties' papers and is inclined to order that this matter be stayed
18 under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction pending review of the issues raised by the federal Food
19 and Drug Administration (FDA). This is a *tentative* ruling and the parties still have an opportunity
20 to present oral argument. Alternatively, if the parties JOINTLY stipulate in writing to entry of the
21 tentative ruling, the hearing will be taken off calendar, and the tentative ruling will become the
22 order of the Court.

23 The Court Plaintiff brings this putative class action alleging that the labels on certain of
24 Gruma Corporation's food products, as well as its advertising and marketing, are false and
25 misleading in violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, Bus. & Prof. Code section
26 17200 *et seq.* ("UCL"); the California False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code section
27 17500 ("FAL"); the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code section 1750 *et seq.*

1 (“CLRA”).¹ Plaintiff alleges that, because Defendant’s Products contain genetically modified
2 organisms (“GMOs”) in the form of corn grown from bioengineered, genetically modified seeds,
3 Defendant’s labels indicating the Products are “All Natural” are false and misleading. (Plaintiff’s
4 Amended Class Action Complaint [Dkt. No. 33, “FAC”] ¶¶ 39-43.)

5 “The primary jurisdiction doctrine allows courts to stay proceedings or to dismiss a
6 complaint without prejudice pending the resolution of an issue within the special competence of an
7 administrative agency... and is to be used only if a claim involves an issue of first impression or a
8 particularly complicated issue Congress has committed to a regulatory agency.” *Clark v. Time*
9 *Warner Cable*, 523 F. 3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008). A court traditionally weighs four factors in
10 deciding whether to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine: “(1) the need to resolve an issue that
11 (2) has been placed by Congress within the jurisdiction of an administrative body having
12 regulatory authority (3) pursuant to a statute that subjects an industry or activity subjects an
13 industry or activity to a comprehensive regulatory authority that (4) requires expertise or
14 uniformity in administration.” *Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech., Inc.*, 307 F.3d 775,
15 781 (9th Cir.2002) (amended).

16 The FDA has regulatory authority over food labeling. *See* 21 U.S.C. § 341 *et seq.* The
17 Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) establishes a uniform federal scheme of food regulation to
18 ensure that food is labeled in a manner that does not mislead consumers. *See* 21 U.S.C. § 341 *et*
19 *seq.* Food labeling enforcement is a matter that Congress has indicated requires the FDA’s
20 expertise and uniformity in administration. Congress amended the FDCA through the passage of
21 the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) to “clarify and to strengthen” the FDA’s “legal
22 authority to require nutrition labeling on foods, and to establish the circumstances under which

23
24 ¹ The FAC, while generally alleging false and misleading advertising and marketing, only
25 recites facts concerning *labeling* of Defendant Gruma’s Mission® Restaurant Style Tortilla
26 Rounds, Mission® Restaurant Style Tortilla Strips and Mission® Restaurant Style Tortilla
27 Triangles (hereinafter, “Defendant’s Products”). (*See, e.g.*, FAC ¶¶ 9, 40, 43). In light of its
28 intention to stay this action and refer the labeling issues to the FDA, the Court declines to rule on
the question of whether Plaintiff’s allegations sufficiently allege a claim for false advertising and
marketing for reasons other than the labeling of Defendant’s Products. Likewise, the Court
reserves ruling on the standing and mootness issues raised in Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at this
time.

1 claims may be made about nutrients in foods.” H.R. Rep. No. 101-538, at 7, *reprinted in* 1990
2 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3336, 3337. No state may “directly or indirectly establish. . . any requirement for
3 the labeling of food that is not *identical* to the [FDCA].” 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a) (emphasis supplied).

4 Focusing particularly on the issues alleged in the FAC, there are no FDA rules requiring
5 that products containing GMO or bioengineered ingredients be labeled as such. The FDA has
6 issued nonbinding industry guidance indicating that it “is not aware of any data or other
7 information that would form a basis for concluding that the fact that a food or its ingredients was
8 produced using bioengineering is a material fact that must be disclosed FDA is therefore
9 reaffirming its decision to not require special labeling of all bioengineered foods.” (Defendant’s
10 Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. A [“Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating
11 Whether Foods Have or Have Not Been Developed Using Bioengineering; Draft Guidance,”
12 released for comment January 2001] at 2.) With respect to the use of the term “natural” on food
13 labels, the agency has published non-binding guidance defining that term to mean that “nothing
14 artificial or synthetic (including all color additives regardless of source) has been included in, or
15 has been added to, a food that would not normally be expected to be in the food.” 58 Fed. Reg.
16 2302, 2407 (Jan. 6, 1993). However, the parties appear to be in agreement that the FDA has not
17 addressed, even informally, the question of whether foods containing GMO or bioengineered
18 ingredients may be labeled “natural” or “all natural,” or whether GMO or bioengineered
19 ingredients would be considered “artificial or synthetic.”

20 Thus, as Plaintiff concedes, “[t]he FAC identifies a gaping hole in the current regulatory
21 landscape for ‘natural’ claims and GMOs, laying out how there is no direct regulation by the FDA
22 of the term ‘natural,’ nor any requirement that a company disclose on a food product’s label
23 whether it contains GMOs.” (Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition
24 [Dkt. No. 47, “Oppo.”] at 1:12-15, citing FAC at ¶¶ 20-25.) However, Plaintiff wrongly concludes
25 that there is no agency charged with determining whether food labels may properly state that GMO
26 products can be labeled “all natural.” The FDCA and NLEA unquestionably and squarely give that
27 authority to the FDA.

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1 Under these circumstances, deference to the FDA's regulatory authority is the appropriate
2 course. *Pom Wonderful, LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.*, 679 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2012); *Clark*, 523
3 F.3d at 1114. Otherwise, the Court would risk "usurp[ing] the FDA's interpretive authority[,] and
4 "undermining, through private litigation, the FDA's considered judgments." *Pom Wonderful*, 679
5 F.3d at 1176, 1178.

6 Based upon the foregoing, the Court is inclined to Order that:

7 (1) this Action be Stayed for a period of six months and referred to the United States Food
8 and Drug Administration for determination of whether products containing GMO or bioengineered
9 ingredients may properly be labeled "Natural" or "All Natural;

10 (2) counsel will confer and submit an agreed upon form of Order for Referral within ten
11 days;

12 (3) the parties and counsel will cooperate in expediting the presentation of this question to
13 the FDA, including assembling any materials or information required by the FDA;

14 (4) counsel will notify this Court promptly of any determination by the FDA; and

15 (5) Defendant's Motion (Dkt. No. 37) is granted with respect to the stay only and is
16 otherwise denied without prejudice to re-filing upon an order dissolving the stay ordered herein.

17 No later than **5:00 p.m. on Monday, June 10, 2013**, the parties may JOINTLY stipulate in
18 writing to entry of this tentative ruling. Otherwise, the hearing will take place as scheduled.

19 The parties should be prepared to address the issues above at the hearing. If the parties
20 intend to rely on authorities not cited in their briefs, they must notify the Court and opposing
21 counsel of these authorities reasonably in advance of the hearing by filing a statement of
22 supplemental authorities, with pinpoint cites, and without argument or additional briefing. *Cf.* Civil
23 L. R. 7-3(d). Copies of the cases should not be filed in the docket, but rather, Counsel should be
24 prepared to provide copies of the supplemental authorities at the hearing. The parties will be given
25 the opportunity at oral argument to explain their reliance on such authority.

26 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

27 **Date: June 7, 2013**



YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE